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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 18–19, 2016, James Goss was tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City for attempted first degree murder (Count I), attempted second degree murder (Count
II), first degree assault (Count III), assault against a police officer (Count IV), three
counts of second degree assault (Counts V, VIII, and X), reckless endangerment (Count
VI), and three counts of carrying a deadly weapon openly with intent to injure (Count
VII, IX, and XI). Case No. 115215011. On the second day of trial, prior to jury
deliberation, the State issued a nolle prosequi on Counts IV, VI, IX, and XI. (Tr2. 8–9).
The jury acquitted Mr. Goss of Counts I and II, but found him guilty of Counts III, VII,
VIII, and X. (Tr2. 191–92). No verdict was rendered for Count V (second degree assault
against Officer Parris) as the jury had found Mr. Goss guilty of the first degree assault
charge. (Tr.2, 184). On May 25, 2016, the court sentenced Mr. Goss to twenty-five years
on Count III, three years concurrent for Count VII, five years consecutive for Count VIII,
and three years consecutive for Count X, for a total of thirty-three years. (Tr3. 16). Mr.
Goss filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on May 31, 2015.1
This appeal follows.
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Citations to the transcript are as follows:
•   Tr1 = first day of trial, April 18, 2016.
•   Tr2 = second day of trial, April 19, 2016.
•   Tr3 = sentencing, May 25, 2016.	
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.  

Did the trial court err during voir dire when, despite requests from both the
defense and the State, the court refused to ask if any potential jurors had
strong feelings about the crime of assault against a police officer?

II.  

Did the trial court err in refusing to provide jury instructions on the issues
of voluntary intoxication and involuntary intoxication when testimony
supported the defense claim that Mr. Goss was substantially intoxicated at
the time of the incident?
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
James Goss graduated from Suitland High School in 2013. (Tr2. 76). He joined
the Army in 2014, but was discharged following basic training so that he could be with
his newborn son. (Tr 2. 81). James Goss enrolled in Saint Augustine University in the
Spring of 2015. At the end of the semester, he returned to Baltimore because he did not
have summer housing at school, and he wanted to be near his young son, who was having
surgery. (Tr2. 76). James Goss had trouble finding a place to live. His only family in the
area was his father, who would not let James live with him because he believed children
over the age of eighteen should support themselves. (Tr2. 77). With nowhere else to go,
Goss stayed with a friend from high school, Chardonnay Hall. (Tr2. 80). Ms. Hall was a
student at the University of Baltimore and lived near campus at the Varsity Apartments
on 30 West Biddle Street. (Tr1. 173).
On July 16, 2016, about a month after he moved in with Ms. Hall, James Goss was
leaving the Varsity when he saw a group of young men coming into the building with a
box of liquor. (Tr2. 85). Although Goss did not know them, he struck up a conversation,
joking to the group, “dang[,] nobody invited me to the party.” (Tr2. 85). They invited
Goss to come, and gave him the apartment number and time of the party, which was the
next evening. (Tr2. 85).
The following day, James Goss spent the afternoon by himself, wandering around
the Art Scape festival. (Tr2. 84). Around 7:30 p.m., he returned to the Varsity and went
to the party alone. (Tr2. 85). There were about twelve or so people there when Goss
arrived. (Tr2. 85). He didn’t know any of them. (Tr2. 85). Shortly after he arrived, one
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of the hosts offered Goss a drink and food. Goss grabbed two slices of pizza while the
man poured him a drink in a red “Solo” cup. (Tr2. 86). Goss thought it was about six
ounces of vodka. (Tr2. 86).
Around 10 p.m.., James Goss and two men from the party left to go walk around
Art Scape to find people to bring back to the party. (Tr2. 87). While he was gone, Goss
left his unfinished drink in the unmarked cup on the counter. (Tr2. 105). When he
returned an hour or so later, he picked up his cup and finished his drink. (Tr2. 107). He
quickly began feeling “dizzy” and “woozy” in a way that he had never felt before. (Tr2.
87–89). He was also getting “tired,” so he left the party to go back to Ms. Hall’s
apartment. (Tr2. 87).
Ms. Hall had also been at Art Scape that day. (Tr1. 193). She returned to her
apartment with a friend after dark. (Tr1. 193). At some point after she got home, James
Goss returned to the apartment. (Tr1. 194). He told Ms. Hall he was drunk and wanted to
have a threesome. (Tr1. 194). He then took her keys and left. (Tr1. 194). Later, Ms. Hall
walked her friend out of the building, forgetting that Goss had her keys. (Tr1. 176). She
sat in the lobby talking to the security guard while she waited for James Goss to return to
let her in. (Tr1. 176). Around 11 p.m., Goss returned, walked past Ms. Hall and the
security guard, and got on the elevator. (Tr2. 17).
Ms. Hall decided to go up to see if her door was unlocked. (Tr1. 176). It was, but
James Goss was not there. (Tr1. 176). In the kitchen, Ms. Hall found two full cups of
alcohol on the counter and a large puddle of alcohol on the floor. (Tr2. 193–194). The
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alcohol had not been there when she left, and she did not keep any alcohol in the
apartment at the time. (Tr1. 176).
Around 11:45 p.m., another resident complained to the security guard, saying
James Goss was at the party and acting up after getting turned down by a female guest.
(Tr2. 18). When the security guard went upstairs, an individual standing outside the
apartment told the guard that everything was under control. (Tr2. 18).
Later that night, Ms. Hall heard banging on her apartment door. (Tr1. 176). It was
James Goss and he was “completely intoxicated.” (Tr1. 176). Ms. Hall let him in and
asked him to return her keys. (Tr1. 177). At first, Mr. Goss was “fine” and began to
check his pockets for the keys. (Tr1. 195). However, when he couldn’t find them, he
began to insist he had given the keys back to her earlier in the day when he returned from
the computer lab. (Tr1. 177). Ms. Hall tried to explain to Mr. Goss that he was
confused—the events he was describing had occurred on a different day. (Tr1. 177). Mr.
Goss suddenly became angry and began to yell at Ms. Hall. (Tr1. 195). He accused her
of “setting him up” and being “out to get him.” (Tr1. 178). Ms. Hall had always known
Mr. Goss to be “nice” and “gentle.” (Tr1. 195). She had never seen him act like this
before. (Tr1. 195). His behavior was “all over the place” and he was saying things that
“really didn’t make sense.” (Tr1. 195).
When Mr. Goss began to yell at Ms. Hall, she pushed him away. (Tr1. 178). Mr.
Goss then punched her in the face and attempted to put her in a choke hold. (Tr1. 178).
Ms. Hall pried Mr. Goss’ arm off and screamed for help. (Tr1. 178). The security guard
heard the yelling and went to Ms. Hall’s apartment. (Tr1. 206). He knocked on the door,
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at which point James Goss grabbed two knives and said that he would “cut [them] both”
if anyone came in.” (Tr1. 178). The security guard left to call 911. (Tr1. 207).
Ms. Hall tried to calm James Goss down by talking about his son. (Tr1. 179). She
was eventually able to take the knives from him, and he began crying and apologizing.
(Tr1. 179; Tr1. 204). Ms. Hall put those knives in her pocket, and ran out of the
apartment to take the elevator downstairs. (Tr1. 179). James Goss grabbed a butter knife
and another kitchen knife, and followed her out of the apartment. (Tr1. 179). When the
elevator arrived, Mr. Goss got on but Ms. Hall did not. (Tr1. 182).
Officer Anthony Callow, one of the police officers who responded to the 911 call,
was in the lobby with the security guard when James Goss got off the elevator. (Tr2. 24).
Goss walked past them and towards the door. (Tr2. 24). Callow’s partner, Officer Teddy
Parris, was just walking into the building. (Tr2. 55). When Goss attempted to exit the
building, Officer Parris put up his arm and instructed Goss to step back inside. (Tr2. 55).
Before Officer Parris could finish his statement, Goss stabbed Officer Parris above his
left eye. (Tr2. 55). The officer lifted Goss up and pinned him against the wall of the
building. (Tr2. 55–56). Goss then began to stab the officer several times in the head and
upper back area. (Tr2. 56). The injuries caused arterial bleeding from Officer Parris’ eye
and ear, and left him with permanent nerve damage to his ear. (Tr2. 59–60).
James Goss was eventually restrained by Officer Callow and the security guard
who by that time had run outside. (Tr2. 214). Ms. Hall came downstairs after Goss was
restrained. (Tr1. 202). She tried to speak to him, but he would not respond. (Tr1. 200).
He was screaming and saying things that did not make any sense, such as accusing Ms.
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Hall of sleeping with the security guard. (Tr1. 202). Mr. Goss also repeatedly threatened
to “cut somebody else” if he broke free. (Tr1. 214). As Officer Callow and the security
guard carried Goss to the police car, Goss bit the security guard on his calf. (Tr1. 216).
James Goss was taken to Johns Hopkins Hospital. (Tr2. 113). At the hospital, he
continued to scream and act combative, and needed to be handcuffed to the bed. (Tr2.
113). The medical records reflect that Goss was “highly intoxicated,” but the hospital
staff did not complete a toxicology report to screen what might be in Goss’ system. (Tr2.
113).
During jury selection, both the State and the defense asked the trial court to screen
for jurors who might have strong feelings about the crime of assault against a police
officer. (Tr1. 3–4). Specifically, defense counsel asked the judge to inquire “Does
anyone have such strong feelings about assaults against law enforcement that you would
be unable to render a fair and impartial decision based on the evidence.” (Tr1. 3). Urging
the trial court to ask some version of defense counsel’s requested question, the prosecutor
agreed that jurors may have opinions about individual police officers and the police
department that might impact their ability to be fair and impartial. (Tr1. 4). The trial
judge denied these requests and following jury selection proceeded to trial. (Tr1. 4).
Prior to jury deliberation, the trial judge reviewed proposed jury instructions with
counsel. (Tr2. 112). The trial judge denied the defense request for instructions on
voluntary intoxication and involuntary intoxication, stating there was not enough
evidence to determine the extent to which James Goss had been impaired. (Tr2. 122; Tr2.
131).
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After the prosecution issued a nolle prosequi on several charges, the jury found
James Goss not guilty of attempted first degree murder or attempted second degree
murder in connection with the attack on Officer Parris. (Tr2. 192). The jury convicted
James Goss on the remaining assault and weapons counts. (Tr2. 192).
Despite James Goss’ relative youth and the fact that this was his first offense, the
trial judge exceeded the recommended sentencing guidelines based on her belief that
Goss “has a problem with authority figures” and is an “extreme danger to society.” (Tr3.
15–16). James Goss was sentenced to the maximum sentence, twenty-five years, on the
top count and eight consecutive years on two remaining counts for a total period of
incarceration of thirty-three years. (Tr3. 16).
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ARGUMENT
I.  

DURING VOIR DIRE, THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
ASK THE REQUESTED, AND THEREFORE NECESSARY QUESTION: “DO ANY
MEMBERS OF THE PANEL HAVE STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT THE CRIME OF
ASSAULT AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER?”
During voir dire, both the State and the defense requested that potential jurors be

screened to see if they had strong feelings about assaults against law enforcement
officers. (Tr1. 3–4). The trial judge declined to ask this question based on the court’s
view that a question about the weight of witness testimony adequately covered the same
territory. (Tr1. 5). Contrary to the judge’s view, the strong feelings question was
required under Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350 (2014). The lower court’s failure to screen
jurors for bias related to the crime charged constitutes reversible error.
A defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial is guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights. Curtin v. State, 393 Md. 593, 600 (2006). The right to a fair trial is protected
in part by the process of voir dire—a process during which questions proposed by the
court or parties are used to screen prospective jurors for bias or prejudice. Id. The
court’s questions during voir dire should “focus on issues particular to the defendant’s
case so that biases directly related to the crime, the witnesses, or the defendant may be
uncovered.” Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 10 (2000) (emphasis added).
Regarding crime-related biases, the Court of Appeals has acknowledged that “the
potential for bias exists in most crimes.” Shim v. State, 418 Md. 37, 54 (2011), abrogated
on other grounds by Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 363 (2014). Therefore, trial courts

	
  

9

	
  

are required to ask “voir dire questions which are targeted at uncovering these biases.”
Shim, 418 Md. at 54. The Court of Appeals suggested in Shim that such biases might be
uncovered by asking “Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings about
[the charges in this case] that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh
the facts[?]” Id.
In Pearson, the Court of Appeals affirmed Shim’s essential holding that the trial
judge, when requested, must ask prospective jurors about crime-related biases. 437 Md.
at 363. However, Pearson rejected the precise phrasing of the Shim question because it
clashed with precedent. Id. at 361. Slightly tweaking the Shim language, the Pearson
court instructed that “on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire: ‘Do any of you
have strong feelings about [the crime with which the defendant is charged]?’” Id. at 363
(emphasis added).
On review, an appellate court must determine whether the trial judge abused his
discretion by conducting questioning that was “not reasonably sufficient to test the jury
for bias, partiality, or prejudice.” Washington v. State, 425 Md. 306, 314 (2012). If a
trial court is required to ask a specific voir dire question, the failure to do so “is an abuse
of discretion constituting reversible error.” Moore v. State, 412 Md. 635, 666-667
(2010). There cannot be “harmless error” if there is an abuse of discretion. Id. at 667.
For example, the failure to ask requested “strong feelings” questions about violations of
narcotics laws, child molestation, and possession of a firearm all have been found to
constitute reversible error. See Curtin, 393 Md. at 610; Thompson v. State, 229 Md. App.
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385 (2016). However, the mandatory nature of a requested “strong feelings” question is
not limited to these types cases. See Pearson, 437 Md. at 363.
In the instant case, both the state and the defense requested that the court ask
potential jurors about whether they had strong feelings regarding the crime of assault
against a police officer. (Tr1. 3). The court refused to make this inquiry. (Tr1. 4). The
trial judge’s failure to ask jurors if they had strong feelings about the incendiary crime
they were being asked to judge—a brutal and seemingly senseless assault on a police
officer—deprived Mr. Goss of his constitutional right to a fair trial. See Curtin, 393 Md.
at 600.
In denying the requested inquiry, the trial judge assumed that any potential bias
concerning the crime charged would be properly uncovered by asking jurors if they
would give more or less weight to the testimony of a police officer because several police
officers were testifying. (Tr.1. 4). This assumption was wrong. The “more or less
weight question” is to determine whether potential jurors might “simply believe police
officers by virtue of the position without regard to testimony from anyone else [or] would
believe the police officers in comparison to civilian witnesses.” Moore, 412 Md. at 653.
A juror may be capable of assessing the credibility of all witnesses equally, and could
thus rationally answer the court’s testimonial weight question, “no.” But, this same juror
may have such strong feelings about an attack on a police officer that she would be
unwilling to accept any proposed defense to the crime.
The potential prejudice engendered by strong feelings about violence targeted
against police officers was also not captured by the trial judge’s broader question of
	
  

11

	
  

whether potential jurors had “strong feelings about attempted murder in the first degree,
attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, assault in the second
degree, reckless endangerment, [or] carrying a deadly weapon openly with intent to
injure.” (Tr1. 22-23). Here again, a potential juror may not feel particularly strongly
about violent crime as a general matter, but may feel quite strongly that police officer’s
should not needlessly be placed in harm’s way. The generic variation of the “strong
feelings” question failed to identify such biases directly related to assaultive crimes
against a police officer.
In 2002, in an era where the “War on Drugs” was a household phrase, the Court
of Special Appeals reasoned, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that jurors should be
asked about the crime charged in narcotics cases due to the strong passions that crime
might engender:
“[l]aws regulating and prohibiting the use of controlled dangerous
substances harbor an unusual position within our criminal code, such that
jurors may be biased because of strong emotions relating to the dangers of
narcotics and their negative effects upon our cities and neighborhoods, or,
on the contrary, biases may exist because of passionate positions that
advocate the decriminalization of narcotics.”
Thomas v. State, 139 Md. App. 188, 207 (2001), aff’d in State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202,
213 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 363–64
(2014). 2 In the instant case, the current political and cultural climate surrounding
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The court in Thomas v. State noted that, at the time, there was much literature in the
field of drug policy focusing on legalization, decriminalization, and medicalization. 139
Md. App. 188, 204 (2001). The court also noted that “[a]t the same time, the ‘drug war’
label transformed those who used drugs . . . into the enemy and then into a subhuman
category of ‘druggies’ or ‘druggers.’ They ceased to be people with drug problems,
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violence and policing raises similar concerns about the need to ask about juror’s “strong
emotions” and “passionate positions” related to police-involved violence.
In the past several years, we have seen increasing national focus on conflicts
between police officers and community members.3 In Baltimore, after the death of
Freddie Gray, protests erupted in the city that left over fifteen police officers hurt, 235
people arrested, and sixty structures burned. Melanie Eversley, One Year Later,
Baltimore Still Reeling from Freddie Gray Death, Riots, USA TODAY, April 18, 2016,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/04/18/one-year-later-baltimore-still-reelingfreddie-gray-death-riots/83181808/.
Mr. Goss’ trial occurred less than a year after the protests in Baltimore impacted
citizens throughout the city (and thus James Goss’ prospective jury pool). His trial
occurred a mere three months after tensions were reignited following the mistrial of the
first officer tried in connection with Freddie Gray’s death. Justin Fenton, Mistrial
Declared in Trial of Officer William Porter in Death of Freddie Gray, BALTIMORE SUN,
Dec. 16, 2015, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-portertrial-jury-wednesday-20151216-story.html.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

chemical disorders, or brain disease, and became the ‘bad guys,’ as the public’s hatred of
drugs grew into a hatred of druggies. For the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and
DEA personnel who train State and local police, this hatred translated into a variety of
practices: druggies and their families could be rousted, humiliated, terrorized, jailed, hurt,
threatened with being shot, or even, if necessary, shot.” Id.
3
See, e.g., Amanda Sakuna and Tracy Jarrett, Protests Continue in NYC and Nationwide
Over Garner Grand Jury, MSNBC, Dec. 4, 2015,
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/protests-continue-nyc-and-nationwide-eric-garner-grandjury; Ferguson Unrest: From Shooting to Nationwide Protests, BBC NEWS, Aug. 10,
2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354.
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In the months surrounding James Goss’ trial, there was also significant attention
being paid to an increase in perceived retaliatory violence against police officers. In
December of 2014, two NYPD officers were ambushed and shot while in their patrol car.
The perpetrator was a young black man, whose last social media post before the shooting
“suggested he planned to kill police officers as revenge for the deaths of Michael Brown
and Eric Garner.” Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Ismaaiyl Brinsley Led Life of Trouble Before
Attack, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 21, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ismaaiyl-brinsley-suspected-of-shooting-new-york-policehad-criminal-history-ties-to-brooklyn-1419188892. News outlets have reported that the
number of ambush-style killings of police officers increased “dramatically” in the first
half of 2016. Emily Shapiro, Deadly Ambush Attacks Against Cops Have Increased
Dramatically This Year: Inside the ‘Troubling’ Report, ABC NEWS, Jul. 27, 2016,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/deadly-ambush-attacks-cops-increased-dramatically-yearinside/story?id=40919862. Likewise, fatal shootings of civilians by police officers also
increased in the first half of 2016. Kimberly Kindy, Fatal Shootings of Police are Up in
the First Six Months of 2016, Post Analysis Finds, WASHINGTON POST, July 7, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fatal-shootings-by-police-surpass-2015srate/2016/07/07/81b708f2-3d42-11e6-84e8-1580c7db5275_story.html.
As with narcotics in Thomas, citizens are likely to have passionate feelings, either
positive or negative, about issues at the forefront of our national consciousness like
violence by and towards police officers. The risk of juror bias was high in Mr. Goss’
case, and the failure to make an inquiry into this particular prejudice deprived Mr. Goss
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of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. The trial judge’s failure to ask the
“strong feelings” question, as mandated by Pearson, clearly warrants reversal. 437 Md.
at 363.
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II.  

BECAUSE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO
DEMONSTRATE THE APPELLANT WAS INTOXICATED AT THE TIME OF THE
INCIDENT, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
PROVIDE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AND
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
At the close of evidence, while reviewing jury instructions, the trial judge

informed the defense that she would not provide the requested instructions regarding
voluntary intoxication and involuntary intoxication. In the trial judge’s view, there was
not sufficient evidence presented at trial to warrant either instruction. (Tr.2. 119).
However, because some evidence was presented at trial that Mr. Goss was intoxicated,
including some evidence that the intoxication may have been involuntary, the trial
judge’s abused her discretion in failing to provide these jury instruction. Because the
defense case proceeded on a theory of intoxication, this abuse of discretion clearly
prejudiced Mr. Goss and therefore requires reversal.
In Maryland, the main purposes of jury instructions are “to aid the jury in
understanding the case, to guide the jury's deliberations, and to help the jury arrive at a
correct verdict.” State v. Allen, 387 Md. 389, 396 (2005). A judge is generally obligated
to give an instruction requested by a party if “(1) the requested instruction is a correct
statement of the law; (2) the requested instruction is applicable under the facts of the
case; and (3) the content of the requested instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in
the jury instruction actually given.” Atkins v. State, 421 Md. 434, 444 (2011). This duty
to instruct the jury includes an obligation to present the law that governs any defenses
supported by “some evidence” adduced at trial. Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 216 (1990).
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As the Court of Appeals has recognized, the “some evidence” standard imposes a
rather low threshold:
Some evidence is not structured by the test of a specific standard. It calls
for no more than what it says-“some,” as that word is understood in
common, everyday usage. It need not rise to the level of “beyond
reasonable doubt” or “clear and convincing” or “preponderance.” The
source of the evidence is immaterial; it may emanate solely from the
defendant. It is of no matter that the . . . claim is overwhelmed by evidence
to the contrary.
Dykes, 319 Md. at 359.
In determining whether “some evidence” exists, the court must view the evidence
“in the light most favorable to the accused.” General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 487 (2002).
The trial judge is not permitted to weigh or disregard evidence that has been presented:
When the trial judge resolves conflicts in the evidence, in the face of the
“some” evidence requirement, and refuses to instruct because he believes
that the evidence supporting the request is incredible or too weak or
overwhelmed by other evidence, he improperly assumes the jury’s role as
fact-finder.
Dykes, 319 Md. at 224. Even if there is substantial evidence contradicting the
defendant’s claim, the defendant is still entitled to an instruction “if there is any evidence
relied on by the defendant which, if believed, would support his claim.” Id. at 359. If the
defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s error in failing to give an instruction, this
constitutes reversible error. Harris v. Harris, 310 Md. 310, 319 (1987).
In the instant case, prior to jury deliberations, the court reviewed the proposed jury
instructions. The court denied defense counsel’s requested instructions on voluntary and
involuntary intoxication. (Tr2. 122, 133). In rejecting the requested instructions, the trial
court looked to Bazzle v. State, a case in which the court similarly refused to give a
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voluntary intoxication instruction. 426 Md. 541, 556 (2012). The trial judge in the
instance case suggested that, under Bazzle, intoxication instructions are only required if a
toxicology report or other expert testimony has been presented. (Tr2, 120, 121). Bazzle
in fact contains no such requirement. The lower court’s reliance on Bazzle to deny the
instruction in the instance case was, thus, misplaced.
Bazzle was an appeal from the trial court’s refusal to give an instruction on
voluntary intoxication. 426 Md. at 547. In Bazzle, there was evidence the defendant had
consumed a significant quantity of alcohol. 426 Md. at 546. However, there was no
evidence introduced as to the impact of that alcohol on the defendant’s functioning or
state of mind. Id. at 555. Although the appellant in Bazzle suffered memory loss, the
memory loss began after he was stabbed. Similarly, the court found that testimony
Bazzle was “about to pass out,” id. at 556, was related to blood loss and not intoxication.
Id. at 558. Bazzle was also “speaking intelligibly” and his actions “demonstrate[d] a
significant amount of design in planning the crime,” which was inconsistent with his
theory of intoxication. Id. at 557. Upon this record, the Bazzle court emphasized that “it
is not the amount [of alcohol] consumed but the effect [of that alcohol] on the consumer
that is important.” Id. at 553. Where there was no testimony offered in the case about
the effect on Bazzle of his heavy drinking, the court found no need for a jury instruction
on intoxication.
In contrast with Bazzle, there was a great deal of evidence presented in the instant
case to show how profoundly impaired James Goss became after consuming a drink at
the party on the night he attacked Officer Parris. Prosecution witness Chardonnay Hall
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testified that James Goss was “completely intoxicated,” when she saw him after his return
from the party. (Tr1. 195). In the several years she had known Mr. Goss, she had never
seen him act in a similar manner before. (Tr1. 201). Instead, she had always known him
to be a “gentle” and “nice” person. (Tr1. 201). Ms. Hall testified that when James Goss
returned from the party his mood was “all over the place,” vacillating from calm, to
violently angry, to crying. (Tr1. 195). James Goss was also out of touch with reality: he
was confused about what day events had occurred; he was also paranoid—accusing Ms.
Hall of being “out to get him,” and irrational—suggesting that Ms. Hall was sleeping
with the security guard, who had worked in the building for only two days. (Tr1. 184,
205).
The medical records following the incident confirmed Chardonnay Hall’s
description of James Goss’ impairment. These records described Goss as intoxicated and
“out of control,” and he needed to be handcuffed to the bed for an hour before calming
down. (Tr2. 116). James Goss testified that on the evening of the incident, he drank only
about “half a cup” in total of vodka at a party. (Tr2. 86). He testified that he left the party
with two other individuals to visit Art Scape, and they were gone for about an hour to an
hour and a half. (Tr2. 86). During this time, Mr. Goss’ unfinished drink sat unattended in
a “Solo” cup on a counter at the party. When he returned, he picked up the cup and drank
what was in it. (Tr2. 104). Mr. Goss testified that he stayed at the party for about an hour
after he returned from Art Scape, and then left when he began to feel “dizzy” and
“woozy.” (Tr2. 87, 107). He testified that he no longer felt in control of himself. (Tr2.
94), and that he had no memory of substantial portions of the night after finishing the
	
  

19

	
  

drink. (Tr2. 88). Mr. Goss believed he was drugged because he “never acted this way
before” and he was unable to “remember anything that happened that night.” (Tr2. 93).
Thus, unlike in Bazzle, there was substantial evidence in the instant case about James
Goss’ intoxication.
There was also a significant question about whether James Goss’ impairment had
been caused voluntarily or involuntarily. A defendant’s intoxication is “presumed to be
voluntary unless some special circumstance is established to remove it from that
category.” Dubs v. State, 2 Md. App. 524, 542 (1967). Such “special circumstance[s]”
include mistake, duress, or intoxication “produced by the acts or contrivance of third
persons.” Id. James Goss presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that his
intoxication could have reasonably been caused by the acts of a third party.
In denying the instruction, the trial judge said:
There was never any testimony from Mr. Goss that at the time the drink
that he was speaking about was poured for him that it was ever done
outside of his presence. So the Court can only assume that he was
watching the gentleman when he poured the drink and gave it directly to
him. I guess he wants the Court to infer that perhaps that—assume rather
that perhaps the incident occurred while his cup was left and he was at the
Art Scape.
(Tr2. 122) (emphasis added). However, the question of whether James Goss’ drink had
been spiked was a logical inference based on the evidence presented that should have
been left for the jury. See Dykes, 319 Md. at 224 (stating that “when the trial judge
resolves conflicts in the evidence . . . because he believes that the evidence supporting the
request is incredible or too weak or overwhelmed by other evidence, he improperly
assumes the jury’s role as fact-finder”). For example, contrary to the trial judge’s
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assumption, there was no testimony that James Goss watched the host pour his drink
when he first arrived at the party. (Tr.2, 86). In addition, Mr. Goss’ testimony that he
believed he had been drugged, along with testimony demonstrating that after his drink
was first poured there were multiple opportunities for his drink to have been tampered
with, was some evidence that his intoxication was produced by the acts or contrivances of
third parties. On this record, there was “some evidence” of James Goss’ intoxication,
either voluntary or involuntary, and the trial court’s failure to give the requested
instructions was error. See Dykes, 319 Md. at 216 (stating that the trial judge has a duty to
present the law that governs any defenses supported by “some evidence” adduced at
trial).
Finally, the failure to give these instructions clearly prejudiced James Goss. James
Goss did not dispute that he was the person who attacked Officer Parris. Rather, his
defense was that at the time he engaged in that conduct he was under the influence of
some substance that rendered him substantially impaired. By refusing to allow these
instructions, the defense’s entire trial strategy was undermined and could not be
presented or even referenced in closing arguments. As defense counsel explained to the
court following the denial of the intoxication instruction, “Clearly, this was my defense.”
(Tr.2, 136).
James Goss’ testimony and the testimony of others was sufficient to provide
“some evidence” that Goss was intoxicated at the time he attacked Officer Parris, Ms.
Hall, and the security guard. Goss also provided “some evidence” that this intoxication
was involuntary. Because the trial judge erred in denying the requested instruction, and
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because James Goss’ main defense was the fact that he was intoxicated at the time he
attacked the officer, the failure to give the instructions clearly prejudiced the defense and
thus constitute reversible error.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Goss respectfully asks that his conviction be
vacated and his case be remanded for a new trial.
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TEXT OF CONSTITIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. CONSTITUTION
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
MARYLAND CONSTITUTION
Maryland Declaration of Rights, art. XXI.
That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation
against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to
prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against
him on oath; and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent
he ought not to be found guilty.
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